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The Rule of Law and the Effectiveness of 
Enforcement of Claims of Former Owners 
Wrongfully Deprived of Their Property 
JOZEF FORYSTEK, PH.D.0F* 
 
For obvious reasons, the paper will present only a brief outline of 
the topic and not a detailed analysis. The author wishes to describe only 
the roots of the guarantees for the protection of property rights in Western 
culture. 
As Dean of the Faculty of Law of the Cardinal Wyszyński 
University in Warsaw Anna Tarwacka mentioned in her paper, property 
protection issues have been present in the European legal tradition for 
hundreds of years. As early as in the described Roman Republic, disputes 
would arise among censors (supervising construction of roads and 
aqueducts) and rich nobiles (landowning senators). Dean Tarwacka 
presented to us a very interesting case: the case of Mark Krassus. 
The tradition of the protection of property against confiscation by a 
ruler is long. In 1215, the famous Magna Carta Libertatum was enacted 
in England. It prohibited confiscation of property without a prior court 
judgment, although it was not applied until the post-Cromwellian times 
after the enactment of the famous Bill of Rights of 1689 by the English 
Parliament. In Poland, one of the first privileges of the nobility was 
enacted under the reign of King Wladislaus Jagiello.1F1 The Privilege of 
Czerwińsk of 1422 also related to the prohibition of confiscating the right 
of ownership without the relevant judicial court approval (or approval 
from an authority independent of the king).2F2 
 
*Attorney-at-law (advocate), Warsaw-Krakow (Poland), www.forystek.pl, email: 
jozef.forystek@forystek.pl. The article is based on a paper prepared for the conference: The 
Confiscation of Property in Poland and Efforts at Resitution, Warsaw 2017, organized by the 
Faculty of Law of the Cardinal Wyszyński University in Warsaw (PL), Loyola Law School, Los 
Angeles (US) and others. 
 1. Wladislaus Jagiello (1362-1434) was the King of Poland and the grandest duke of 
Lithuania who ruled for the longest period of time (1386-1434). 
 2. WACŁAW URUSZCZAK, HISTORIA PAŃSTWA I PRAWA POLSKIEGO (966–1795) [HISTORY 
OF THE POLISH STATE AND LAW (966–1795)] 158 (2005); KRZYSZTOF BACZKOWSKI, WIELKA 
HISTORIA POLSKI: DZIEJE POLSKI PÓŹNOŚREDNIOWIECZNEJ (1370–1506) [THE GREAT HISTORY 
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The origins of the contemporary understanding of the constitutional 
rule of protection of property date back to Thomas Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 (U.S.), which not only 
proclaimed the birth of the United States of America, but also stated that 
the right of ownership is an inherent right of every human being. This 
notion was repeated several years later in the United States Constitution 
(and, specifically, in the Bill of Rights of 1791), and in the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 during the French 
Revolution. Marie-Joseph La Fayette (a military officer who fought in 
the American Revolutionary War) prepared the French Declaration and 
France’s National Constituent Assembly passed it. 
Issues related to the use of confiscation of properties for political 
purposes during the partition of Poland have been presented in a very 
interesting and exceptionally detailed manner by Professor Sławomir 
Godek from the Cardinal Wyszyński University in Warsaw, which is 
hosting us today. For that reason, I shall omit topics referred to in the 
paper of the preceding speaker. 
The first constitution of the reborn Polish state, enacted in March 
1921 (modelled on the French Constitution of the 3rd Republic), provided 
for the protection of property rights in its Article 99.3F3 The Article states, 
“the Republic of Poland recognizes all property, whether belonging 
personally to individual citizens or collectively to associations of citizens, 
institutions, self-government organizations, or the state itself, as one of 
the most important bases of social organization, legal order, and 
guarantees to all citizens, institutions, and associations, protection of their 
property, permitting only in cases provided by a statute, the abolition or 
limitation of property, whether personal or collective, for reasons of 
higher utility, against compensation.”4F4 Only a statute may determine to 
what extent property, for reasons of public utility, shall form the 
exclusive property of the state, and how far rights of citizens and their 
legally recognized associations to freely use land, waters, minerals, and 
other resources of nature, may be subject to limitations for public 
reasons.5F5 Similar provisions were adopted in the April Constitution of 
1935. There is, however, a disagreement as to the regularity of its 
adoption by the members of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with 
 
OF POLAND: HISTORY OF POLAND IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1370–1506)] 125 (Jan Pieszczachowicz 
et. al. eds., 1999). 
 3. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 17, 1921, art. 99 
(Dz. U. nr. 44, pos. 267) (Pol.). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
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the Government (“BBWR”) because of the absence of the opposition 
members of the parliament in the Chamber. 
After World War II, the issue of the protection of property was first 
confirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United 
Nations of 1948. The protection of property was then confirmed in Article 
1 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights, an international agreement ratified by 
Poland in the years 1994 and 1995, and published in the Journal of Laws 
of the Republic of Poland in 1995. 
Today, much more precise provisions are included in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, as confirmed in Article 
2. It says, “the Republic of Poland shall be a democratic state ruled by 
law and implementing the principles of social justice,”6F6 and according to 
Article 21(1) “the Republic of Poland shall protect ownership and the 
right of succession.”7F7 
The question is whether the Constitution of 1997 applies to the 
illegal acts of state that involved deprivation of property of whole groups 
of citizens (so-called social classes), owners of land properties, owners 
of Warsaw lands, entrepreneurs, and pharmacists? And if so, does it have 
a retroactive effect in this respect? 
Contrary to the position of the Commissioner for Human Rights that 
has been presented by Ms. Małgorzata Świątczak from the Department 
of Civil Law in the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
answer to such questions should be clearly in the affirmative. Article 
239(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland explicitly provides 
that the Constitutional Tribunal rules on the non-conformity to the 
Constitution of statutes adopted before they come into force, and Article 
8(1) and (2) further establish a principle of supremacy of the Constitution 
and its direct application.8F8 It was confirmed in numerous rulings of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, such as in a judgment of March 31, 1998,9F9 and 
in a judgment of June 16, 1999.10F10 
The fundamental human rights, including the right of ownership, are 
“inherent.” Therefore, the Constitution does not grant this right, but 
merely confirms its permanent nature regardless of political changes. The 
nature of that right, which is “pre-state and supra-constitutional,” has 
 
 6. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 2 (Dz. 
U. nr. 78, poz. 483) (Pol.). 
 7. Id. art. 21(1). 
 8. Id. arts. 8(1), 8(2), 239(1). 
 9. Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 24/97, Mar. 31, 1998 (Pol). 
 10. Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 4/98, June 16, 1999 (Pol.). 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  3:13 PM 
492 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
been rooted in that human dignity. Thus, simple human justice requires 
that persons who have been wrongfully and illegally deprived of their 
property as a result of actions pursued by an undemocratic legislator—
like those who were persecuted by Tsars during the partition of Poland, 
about which we have been informed by Prof. Sławomir Godek—should 
either have their real property returned to them in kind or at least have 
any form of formal rightful financial compensation. 
Therefore, the present constitutional provisions are a triumph of the 
supporters of natural law, since the existence of personal rights, including 
the right of ownership based on the “inherent and inalienable human 
dignity,” are defined in Article 30 of the Constitution, which is “a source 
of fundamental human rights” that must be respected and protected by 
public authorities.11F11 The right of ownership is not a gift from the 
legislature, but is inherent in the dignity of every human being. Therefore, 
the fundamental civil rights and freedoms are rooted in inherent human 
dignity, which means that they are “pre-state and supra-constitutional.” 
I should now clarify that by the right of ownership I mean its 
broadest concept: not only a classic triad of possession, benefiting from 
property and free disposal, but also the entire scope of claims that may 
usually be raised by the owners against persons infringing such rights, 
including claims for compensation for unlawful deprivation of property. 
The fundamental constitutional principles arising from the democratic 
rule of law include the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations adopted into the Polish legal system from the rule of the 
“state of law” developed in judicial decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
It is a guaranteed principle. It provides that laws may not be adopted 
in a manner that would be uncontrollable for a citizen and that might be 
a specific “trap for the citizen.” If the legislature granted the right of 
indemnity or compensation, it should comply with its obligations in 
accordance with the “pacta sunt servanda” principle. This principle gives 
rise to other more specific rules, which include the following principles: 
lex retro non agit (law does not apply retroactively) that is one of the 
fundamental principles of a civilized legal system; the principle of decent 
legislation; the obligation to apply transitional provisions; the principle 
of appropriate vacatio legis; the principle of maintenance of rights 
acquired (it refers also to the maximum established expectations, 
including claims under the Warsaw Decree and is connected with another 
principle of the protection of continuing interests), whilst the principle of 
 
 11. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 30. 
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legal certainty (regulatory texts should be drawn up correctly in terms of 
their language and logic and should be understood by the addressees) 
provides for control of the purpose and rationality of legislative actions 
(for example, a review commission), and constitutes a condition for a 
prohibition on creating “an apparent existence of a personal right” where 
such right cannot be actually enforced. It may be easily noticed that those 
in power have the biggest problem with the principle of equality before 
the law.12F12 Thus, how to rationally justify the operation of the so-called 
Bug River Act (Act on Exercising the Right to Compensation Arising 
from Leaving Real Properties Outside the Current Borders of the Polish 
State) granting financial compensation in the amount of 20 percent of the 
value of lost real properties to persons who had been forced to leave their 
properties in the Eastern Lands incorporated to the Soviet Union as a 
result of the decisions of the Big Three (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) in Teheran and Yalta, given that 
simultaneously a similar act on the properties lost within the current 
borders of Poland was missing.13F13 
It is hard to explain the chessboard legal paradox when cases such 
as the following have happened under this system.  Mr. X has been a 
continuous owner of a multi-story residential town house located at 
Szewska or Floriańska Streets in Kraków, and his brother owns a similar 
town house at Piotrowska Street in Łódź, but their cousins from Warsaw, 
living in the same Puławska Street, are in the neighbourhood of Warsaw’s 
Ursynów District and have maintained the ownership of his town house. 
His brother has a similar residential house that was not destroyed during 
World War II located a few hundred metres north (within the so-called 
small Warsaw of 1939) and could not have used his property, because the 
Bierut Decree on Warsaw Lands had been applied in that case. 
However, the most important principle is the protection of property 
rights, and the resulting restrictions imposed on every public authority. 
According to Article 31(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 
which proclaims the principle of proportionality, any limitation upon the 
constitutional right of property (as well as other rights and freedoms) may 
be imposed only by statute and only when necessary in a democratic state 
for the protection of its security and public order, to protect the natural 
environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other 
 
 12. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 32. 
 13. Ustawa z dnia 8 lipca 2005 r. o realizacji prawa do rekompensaty z tytułu pozostawienia 
nieruchomości poza obecnymi granicami Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Act on Exercising the Right 
to Compensation Arising from Leaving Real Properties Outside the Current Borders of the Polish 
State] (2005 Dz. U. nr. 169 poz. 1418) [hereinafter Bug River Act] (Pol.). 
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persons.14F14 They cannot by any means violate the essence of the property 
rights. It is confirmed also by Article 64(3) of the Polish Constitution, 
according to which “the right of ownership may only be limited by means 
of a statute and only to the extent that it does not violate the substance of 
such right.”15F15 The essence of the right of ownership is the famous triad: 
the ability to use the property, the ability to collect profits and other 
income, and the freedom to dispose of the property. 
The furthest-reaching interference with the right of ownership is 
expropriation and forfeiture of property (Article 46 of the Constitution 
says property may be forfeited only in cases specified by statute and only 
by virtue of a final judgment of a court).16F16 According to Article 21(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, “expropriation may be 
allowed solely for public purposes and for just compensation.”17F17 
Therefore, any expropriation is conditional upon existence of a public 
purpose. The basic criterion defining the public purpose (interest) is a 
general availability of the effects of the expropriation. Not every property 
that may be assigned for public purposes can be expropriated because the 
term “solely for” used by the Constitution provides for the “necessity” of 
such expropriation. 
The right to compensation for damage caused by unlawful acts of 
public authorities is also important. Article 77 of the Constitution forms 
a foundation for the State’s liability for damages—”everyone shall have 
the right to compensation for any harm done to him by any action of 
public authority contrary to law”18F18 and “statutes shall not bar the recourse 
by any person to the courts in pursuit of claims alleging infringement of 
freedoms or rights.”19F19 Article 121 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland of March 1921 had similar language providing that every citizen 
has the right to compensation for damage inflicted upon him by civil or 
military organs of state authorities, and by an official act not in 
accordance with the right or duties of the service.20F20 The State is 
responsible for the damage, jointly with the guilty organs; actions may be 
brought against the State and against officials independently of any 
permission by a public authority. Here, we are facing a clash of “law” and 
“history.” However, it should be borne in mind that the process of 
redevelopment of the ownership structure after the transformation of the 
 
 14. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 31. 
 15. Id. art. 64(3). 
 16. Id. art. 46. 
 17. Id. art. 21(2). 
 18. Id. art. 77(1). 
 19. Id. art. 77(2). 
 20. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 17, 1921, art. 121. 
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political system has not yet ended. This will happen only after the 
adoption and implementation of the Reprivatization Act. The legal 
interpretation should be such that the totalitarian laws of the so-called 
“Lublin” Poland should be interpreted in accordance with the idea of the 
democratic rule of law. 
The question is whether in the light of this rule of law the former 
owners have effective legal measures (instruments) to effectively pursue 
their property claims in Poland in the twenty-first century. 
The last constitutional rule that should be mentioned is the principle 
of equal share in the public duties and responsibilities laid down in Article 
84 of the Constitution.21F21 I would like to illustrate the above issues by 
highlighting several cases brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) in Strasbourg or before the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal: 
I.   THE CASE OF ZAKŁADY WAPIENNE OGÓREK (OGÓREK LIMESTONE 
PLANT) 
In general, the case refers to all entities whose enterprises were 
nationalized under the Act on the Acquisition of Basic Industries of 
1946.22F22 The most important requirement is that the owner of the acquired 
enterprise was a natural person. The unlawful nationalization decisions 
were issued in two stages: the main decision in 1948 and the second 
decision, specifying the acquired property, in 1961, i.e., a decision 
approving the hand-over report drawn up in 1951. In 1992, the sons of 
the owner filed an application for annulment of the decision of 1948 and 
for compensation. 
By its decision of 2003 (IV SAB 82-83/03), the Supreme 
Administrative Court dismissed an action for failure to act brought by the 
heirs against the Prime Minister and held that the failure to act regarding 
a normative activity of the public administration body did not fall within 
its jurisdiction. Thus, an administrative path of claiming compensation 
for the nationalized enterprise was closed, in which right to compensation 
was granted under the Act that was still effective, i.e., in Article 3, Article 
7(1), and Article 7(6) of the Nationalization Act on the Acquisition by 
the State of Basic Industries of January 3, 1946. 
Because the case continued for a long time with no decision being 
issued, in 2004 the limestone plant—on the basis of Article 3, Article 7(1) 
and Article 7(6) of the Nationalization Act on the Acquisition by the State 
 
 21. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 84. 
 22. Ogórek v. Poland, App. No. 28490/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012). 
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of Basic Industries of January 3, 1946,23F23 which provided for 
compensation for an acquired enterprise—demanded the publication of 
an implementing regulation to that Act. Under the decisions of 2004 and 
2005, the Prime Minister discontinued the proceedings on the grounds 
that a claim for issuance of a legal act cannot be pursued before a court 
even if the obligation to issue the act is prescribed by law. The 
Voivodship Administrative Court dismissed the complaint and the 
Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 2006 dismissed the 
cassation appeal on the grounds that a claim for the adoption of 
administrative provisions cannot be pursued in administrative 
proceedings, and at the same time the Voivodship Administrative Court 
pointed out that the claim can be pursued in civil proceedings regarding 
a so-called legislative lawlessness. 
The plaintiffs brought an action for compensation for the legislative 
neglect that consisted of the failure of the Council of Ministers to adopt 
an implementing regulation, which prevented the exercise of the statutory 
right to compensation. At first, the court delivered a default judgment but 
as a result of an objection by the State Treasury, the case was examined 
from its beginning. A judgment of the court of the first instance was 
delivered in 2006. In the same year, the court of the second instance 
dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court in a final 
decision of 2007 refused to proceed with the cassation appeal by 
reference to a resolution of the Supreme Court of November 24, 2005.24F24 
In that resolution, the Court held that in the cases where the state of 
neglect commenced before entry into force of the amendment of Article 
417 of the Civil Code,25F25 which provides for compensation for the 
legislative neglect, such compensation cannot be pursued because 
“omission of issuance of an implementing regulation by the Council of 
Ministers, as provided for in Article 7(4) and Article 7(6) of the 
Nationalization Act on the Acquisition by the State of Basic Industries of 
January 3, 1946 (Journal of Laws No. 3, item 17 as amended) until the 
effective date of the Act on Amending the Act on the Civil Code and 
Certain Other Acts of June 17, 2004 (Journal of Laws, No. 162, item 
1692), did not constitute the basis for a claim by the owner of the acquired 
enterprise for compensation on those grounds.” 26F26 
 
 23. Ustawa o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych gałęzi gospodarki narodowej 
[Act on the Nationalization of Basic Branches of the State Economy], art. 3 (1946 Dz. U. nr. 3, poz. 
17) (Pol.); id. art 7(1); id. art. 7(6). 
 24. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 82/05 Nov. 24, 2005 (Pol.). 
 25. Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. - Kodeks cywilny [The Act of April 23, 1964 Civil 
Code] art. 417 (1964 Dz. U. nr. 16 poz. 93) (Pol.). 
 26. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 82/05 Nov. 24, 2005 (Pol.). 
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Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, a delegation to adopt a 
regulation prescribed by law does not meet the current constitutional 
standards because it is not sufficiently precise. With this decision, the 
persons harmed by the Nationalization Act were deprived of their right to 
pursue before the court even their claims for compensation awarded to 
them under the law of the then communist state. Only when following the 
exchange of the so-called observations (i.e., pleadings) by the parties did 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg attempt to issue the 
so-called pilot judgement in the case of the complaint of the Ogórek 
Brothers (similar to the one issued a few years earlier in the case of 
Broniowski) in the course of the supervisory administrative proceedings 
pending since 1990. Only in 2007 was a decision adopted on the 
annulment of the nationalization decisions of 1948, and only in 2009 was 
a decision adopted on the annulment of the decision of 1961, which made 
it possible to obtain compensation under a judgment of a civil court 
according to Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure.27F27 
In such a situation in 2012, the Ogórek case was considered 
premature by the Strasbourg Court, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Following adoption of the decisions on annulment of the 
nationalization rulings, the heirs filed a claim for compensation that was 
admitted by the civil court, first in a judgment of the first instance of 
2011,28F28 and then in a judgment of a Court of Appeal in 2013.29F29 
Therefore, those entities against whom unlawful nationalization 
decisions were adopted have a chance to obtain compensation in a normal 
administrative procedure provided they prove that the decisions were 
adopted in gross violation of the laws then in force,30F30 for example, if the 
actual employability per one shift was much lower than that established 
in the nationalization decision, or if the Nationalization Act was applied 
to enterprises to which it was not applicable. 
Currently, there are two related cases pending before the Strasbourg 
Court (No. 1680/08 and 3117/08).31F31 So far, they have been inactivated by 
 
 27. Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego [Code of Administrative Procedure], Jun, 14, 
2016, art. 160 (Dz. U. nr. 98, poz. 1071). 
 28. Sąd Okręgowy [District Court], II C 271/09 (Pol.). 
 29. Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Court of Appeals], I ACa  1069/11, Apr. 25, 2013 
(Pol.). 
 30. See also Jozef Forystek, Przedawnienie roszczeń o odszkodowanie za szkody 
spowodowane bezprawną decyzją administracyjną (Glosa do postanowienia Sądu Najwyższego z 
9 lipca 2009 r., III CZP 47/09) [Limitation of Claims for Compensation for Damages Caused by 
an Unlawful Administrative Decision (Gloss to the decision of the Supreme Court of July 9, 2009, 
III CZP 47/09] 4 PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY [JUD. REV.] 28 (2010) (Pol.). 
 31. Lubelska Fabryka Maszyn i Narzędzi Rolniczych “Plon” v. Poland, App. No. 1680/08, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (entered 2007) and Przedsiębiorstwo Naftowe “Oterna” v. Poland, App. No. 3117/08, 
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the Court, but perhaps in the near future the procedure for the exchange 
of observations (pleadings) between the parties shall be implemented. 
With regard to legal persons who, according to the principle of 
equality before the law, should have the same rights as natural persons, it 
now appears to be the only possible way because the previous draft 
reprivatization acts did not include legal persons among the entities 
entitled to claim reprivatization compensation. 
II.   THE BUG RIVER CASE (HEIRS OF THE TEISSEYRE BROTHERS)32F32 
In connection with the arrangements made during the conferences 
of the Big Three in Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945), 
and incorporation of Eastern Poland, the so-called Kresy, by the Soviet 
Union, the grandparents lost (upon consent of the government of the 
“Lublin” Poland) real property (a tenement house) in Lviv. 
In 2005, after the pilot judgment of the ECHR in the case of 
Broniowski v. Poland (2004),33F33 the so-called Bug River Act was adopted. 
It provided for the right to so-called monetary compensation for the lost 
properties at only twenty percent of their value (or much lower because 
the legislature introduced a conversion table).34F34 
In 2007, the grandchildren of the former owner applied for the Bug 
River compensation. However, both the Voivode of Silesia (in February 
2010) and the then Minister of State Treasury (in 2010) decided that the 
compensation should be granted to one of the brothers only, and the other 
one was refused such right due to the lack of Polish citizenship. This 
occurred in a situation where their grandfather had Polish citizenship at 
the time he lost his property in Lviv to the Soviet Union, and where the 
right of inheritance was protected in a similar manner as the right of 
property.35F35 
It is worth noting that the brother is also a Finnish citizen (after the 
judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court in 2016 his Polish 
nationality was recovered). The Finnish nationality was acquired by his 
father in the 1980s, and it extended automatically to the then minor 
second brother. The Voivodship Administrative Court (“WSA”) in its 
judgment of 2011 and the Supreme Administrative Court (“NSA”) in its 
 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), were each ended by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Lubelska Fabryka Maszyn i Narzedzi Rolniczych ‘Plon’ and Others v. Poland, HUDOC nr. 1680/08 
(Oct. 3, 2017). 
 32. Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Poland, 2014 E.C.R. I-28. 
 33. Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (2004). 
 34. 2005 Dz. U. nr. 169 poz. 1418. 
 35. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 62(2). 
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judgment of November 24, 2014,36F36 dismissed the complaints as they did 
not find any infringement of the constitutional right of succession, the 
protection of property, and expectation of compensation. The 
administrative courts did not make use of the possibility to apply the in 
dubio pro libertate interpretation of laws. 
The Luxembourg Court dealt only with the small aspect of that case 
that is the freedom of movement of persons, and because he was a Finnish 
citizen who resided permanently in Finland, the Court refused to give a 
preliminary ruling because it did not find any cross-border element (lack 
of ratione materiae) in the concerned case.37F37 
In December 19, 2017, the Constitutional Tribunal decided to 
discontinue constitutional complaint No. SK 1/17 regarding infringement 
on the principle of equality before the law, the principle of 
proportionality, and the succession rights.38F38 
III.   WARSAW LANDS, AGRARIAN REFORM, AND FORESTS 
What needs to be discussed separately is the issue of properties 
seized under the Bierut Decree of October 26, 1945 on Warsaw lands.39F39 
The same applies to nationalization without any compensation under the 
Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of September 9, 
1944 on Agrarian Reform.40F40 Such a method of deprivation of property 
has not been previously provided by any legal system of the Western 
states.41F41 The issue of nationalization of forests remains open. There are 
several cases relating to it that are pending in Strasbourg, for example, 
 
 36. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2024/11, Nov. 
24, 2014 (Pol.). 
 37. No C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Poland, 2014 E.C.R. I-28. 
 38. Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 1/17, Dec. 19, 2017 (Pol.). 
 39. Dekret z dnia 26 października 1945 r. o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. 
st. Warszawy [Decree of October 26, 1945 on the Ownership and Use of Land in the Area of the 
Capital City of Warsaw] (1945 Dz. U. nr. 50 poz. 279, as amended) (Pol.). 
 40. See Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z 6 września 1944 r. o 
przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej. [Decree of the Committee for National Liberation of September 
6, 1944 Concerning the Agricultural Reform] (1944 Dz. U. no. 4 poz. 17, as amended) (Pol.); Jozef 
Forystek, Glosa do postanowienia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 1 marca 2010 r. P 107/08 (dot. 
zmiany trybu administracyjnego na sa˛dowy w sprawach reformy rolnej) [Gloss to the decision of 
the Constitutional Tribunal of March 1, 2010, Ref. Act P 107/08 (on changing the administrative 
procedure to the court procedure in matters of agricultural reform)], 3 ZESZYTY NAUKOWE 
SĄDOWNICTWA ADMINISTRACYJNEGO [SCIENTIFIC J. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY] 165 (2010) 
(Pol.). 
 41. See generally PIOTR KUCIUBINSKI, POWOJENNE PRZEKSZTAŁCENIA WŁASNOŚCIOWE W 
ŚWIETLE KONSTYTUCJI [POST-WAR OWNERSHIP TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION] (2013) (Pol.). 
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the Zambrzycki case (it is another example of the legislative neglect of 
2001).42F42 
IV.   A BRIEF SUMMARY 
Each of the cases presented above shows that the measures available 
to the legal successors of former owners are not sufficient.43F43 When 
confronted with state policy, they usually lose. The cases before the 
Polish public administration bodies and courts last for several years or 
even longer. Often, they return to the administrative stage. For example, 
in the well-known Beller case, there were sixteen judgments delivered by 
administrative courts, a similar number of administrative decisions, and 
the state unit is still in possession of the real property without a proper 
title and despite the fact that the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe has implemented a procedure to enforce a judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights.44F44 The first judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights which confirmed infringement of the right to be 
tried within a reasonable time was delivered in 2003 and another 
complaint is now pending before the Court. This shows a weakness of the 
controlling authorities of the Council of Europe. 
Obviously, there may be numerous postulates. First, we should call 
for urgent adoption of a comprehensive restitution act which should 
resolve the so-called hard cases in which two rules of property ownership 
and interests of persons who rightly obtained the property titles after 
World War II collide. Such disputes are unavoidable since the interests 
of both groups obviously collide. It is the legislator who, as quickly as 
possible by way of the reprivatization act, should appropriately balance 
the arguments on the part of the wronged heirs and persons who, after 
World War II, lawfully acquired rights to the same real properties. A false 
myth is that ruling courts contributed in any manner to the violation of 
the rights of persons who had acquired the properties in good faith. It is 
just the opposite. In my nearly twenty-five years of practice, I have not 
 
 42. Zambrzycki v. Poland, App. No. 63007/13, joint to the case Zamoyski and 23 Others v. 
Poland, App. No. 19912/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018). 
 43. See, e.g., Jozef Forystek, Dochodzenie roszczeń reprywatyzacyjnych w świetle 
orzecznictwa sądów cywilnych i administracyjnych oraz Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Pursuit of 
Reprivatization Claims in the Light of the Judgments of Civil and Administrative Courts and the 
Constitutional Tribunal], 21 MONITOR PRAWNICZY [LEGAL MONITOR] 1133 (2011) (Pol.); Jozef 
Forystek, Odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza Skarbu Państwa w sprawach reprywatyzacyjnych 
[Liability for Damages of the State Treasury in Reprivatization Cases], 3 TRANSFORMACJE PRAWA 
PRYWATNEGO [TRANSFORMATION PRIVATE L.] 29 (2011) (Pol.). 
 44. Beller v. Poland, HUDOC no. 51837/99 (2005) and Beller v. Poland, HUDOC no. 
6992/11. 
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seen any single judgement of civil or administrative courts that would not 
protect the rights acquired in good faith. This is the purpose of the 
generally accepted principle of public credibility of land and mortgage 
registers. Obviously, it does not apply to the property of the State 
Treasury or of communes because until the ownership transformations 
commenced after the “Round Table” finally ended, the public bodies 
must take into account the possible obligation to restitute the property to 
the rightful owners, unless they have received appropriate compensation. 
This complies with the rule of equal share in the public duties pursuant 
to Article 84 of the Constitution,45F45 according to which no citizen should 
bear an excessive burden for the entire society. This idea in particular 
applies to those citizens whose properties, illegally nationalized, have 
been used during the last seventy years. 
An important postulate is to authorize the administrative courts to 
resolve administrative matters as to the merits and not only to repeal 
defective administrative decisions. There should also be a radical 
reduction of court fees in matters where claims for compensation are 
based on Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure or other 
preliminary rulings, as well as in matters concerning damage caused by 
legislative lawlessness or legislative neglect.46F46 
 
 
 45. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP][CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 
81 (Pol.). 
 46. For further information, see Jozef Forystek, Odpowiedzialność deliktowa za zaniechanie 
wydania decyzji administracyjnej [Non-Contractual (Tort) Liability for Failure to Issue an 
Administrative Decision],5 PALESTRA 15 (2017) (Pol.). 
